Titre
Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship
Type
article
Institution
Externe
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Matouschek, N.
Auteure/Auteur
Ramezzana, P.
Auteure/Auteur
Robert-Nicoud, F.
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
ISSN
0014-2921
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2009-01
Volume
53
Numéro
1
Première page
19
Dernière page/numéro d’article
36
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We endogenize separation in a search model of the labor market and allow for bargaining over the continuation of employment relationships following productivity shocks to take place under asymmetric information. In such a setting separation may occur even if continuation of the employment relationship is privately efficient for workers and firms. We show that reductions in the cost of separation, owing for example to a reduction in firing taxes, lead to an increase in job instability and, when separation costs are initially high, may be welfare decreasing for workers and firms. We furthermore show that, in response to an exogenous reduction in firing taxes, workers and firms may switch from rigid to flexible employment contracts, which further amplifies the increase in job instability caused by policy reform.
PID Serval
serval:BIB_C5C4CF2D3576
Date de création
2016-10-27T09:12:13.604Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-21T00:20:04Z