Titre
Optimal Seigniorage and Financial Liberalization
Type
article
Institution
Externe
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Bacchetta, P.
Auteure/Auteur
Caminal, R.
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
ISSN
0261-5606
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1992-12
Volume
11
Numéro
6
Première page
518
Dernière page/numéro d’article
538
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper analyzes the effect of financial integration for countries relying on the taxation of their domestic financial system. A two-country model with overlapping generations and explicit financial intermediation is used. Governments derive revenues from seigniorage and set optimally, but non-cooperatively, the rate of inflation and the level of required reserves on bank deposits. A financial liberalization leads to lower reserve ratios, higher inflation rates, and larger stocks of government debt. When the liberalization is anticipated, governments may temporarily increase the reserve ratios before the liberalization occurs
PID Serval
serval:BIB_65CBAE99A868
Date de création
2009-03-30T12:11:39.718Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-20T17:04:33Z