Tacit Collusion, Fairness and Reciprocity

Iris, D.

Titre

Tacit Collusion, Fairness and Reciprocity

Type

working paper

Institution

UNIL/CHUV/Unisanté + institutions partenaires

Série

Cahiers de recherches économiques

Auteur(s)

Santos Pinto, L.

Auteure/Auteur

Iris, D.

Auteure/Auteur

Liens vers les personnes

Santos Pinto, Luis Pedro

Liens vers les unités

Département d'économie

Unité

Université de Lausanne - HEC - DEEP

Date de publication

2008-10

Numéro

09.03

Nombre de pages

23

Langue

anglais

Notes

Working paper

Résumé

This paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity in dynamic market games. A reciprocal player responds to kind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that for general perceptions of fairness, reciprocity facilitates collusion in dynamic market games. The paper also shows that this is a robust result. It holds when players' choices are strategic complements and strategic substitutes. It also holds under grim trigger punishments and optimal punishments.

PID Serval

serval:BIB_50A89BEF7A2C

Permalien

https://iris.unil.ch/handle/iris/69046

URL éditeur

http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series

Date de création

2008-12-01T20:47:24.515Z

Date de création dans IRIS

2025-05-20T16:11:31Z

Fichier(s)

Nom

BIB_50A89BEF7A2C.P001.pdf

Version du manuscrit

preprint

Taille

238.19 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

PID Serval

serval:BIB_50A89BEF7A2C.P001

URN

urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_50A89BEF7A2C4

Somme de contrôle

(MD5):6afd6f22b5782c4fde27307504bee5f0