Titre
Regulation and altruism
Type
article
Institution
UNIL/CHUV/Unisanté + institutions partenaires
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Jelovac, Izabela
Auteure/Auteur
Kembou Nzale, Samuel
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
Liens vers les unités
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2019-03-27
Volume
22
Numéro
1
Première page
49
Dernière page/numéro d’article
68
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and healthcare provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from agent to agent. Some agents, the altruistic ones, care more than the regulator does while others, the selfish agents, care less. Moral hazard is present due to both the agent's effort and the joint outcome that are not contractible. Adverse selection is present too since the regulator cannot a priori distinguish between altruistic and selfish agents. Contracts consist of a simple transfer from the regulator to the agents together with the regulator's input in the joint production. We show that, under the conditions of our setting and when we face both moral hazard and adverse selection, the regulator maximizes welfare with a menu of contracts, which specify higher transfers for the altruistic agents and higher regulator's inputs for the selfish agents.
PID Serval
serval:BIB_C2B66E2E5BA5
Date de création
2020-10-20T15:07:16.160Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-20T23:53:58Z