Journal of Economic Theory
Loading...
ISSN
0022-0531
1095-7235
Publisher
Elsevier
Description
Source: Sherpa Romeo
20 results
Publication
Now showing 1 - 10 of 20
- Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , Uniformly self-justified equilibria(2023-09) ;Kubler, FelixScheidegger, SimonType:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , Schumpeterian competition in a Lucas economy(Elsevier BV, 2023-03) ;Andrei, DanielCarlin, Bruce I.Type:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Restricted , Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture(2020-01) ;Alger, Ingela ;Weibull, Jörgen W.Lehmann, LaurentType:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants(2019-11) ;Mehmet, Karakaya ;Bettina, KlausJan Christoph, SchlegelType:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , Corrigendum to “Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand logic” [J. Econ. Theory 140 (1) (2008) 162–196](2019-05)Bilbiie, F.O.This paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis. Aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation. While ‘moderate’ participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy, low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom. The slope of the ‘IS’ curve changes sign, the ‘Taylor principle’ is inverted, optimal welfare-maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the effects and propagation of shocks are changed. However, a targeting rule implementing optimal policy under commitment delivers equilibrium determinacy regardless of the degree of asset market participation. Our results may justify Fed’s behavior during the ‘Great Inflation’ period.Type:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized(2018-07) ;Hafalir, I.E. ;Hakimov, R. ;Kübler, D.Kurino, M.We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.Type:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Open Access , Delegated portfolio management, optimal fee contracts, and asset prices(2016-09)Sato, Y.This paper proposes a model of asset-market equilibrium with portfolio delegation and optimal fee contracts. Fund managers and investors strategically interact to determine funds' investment profiles, while they share portfolio risk through fee contracts. In equilibrium, their investment decisions, fee schedules, and stock price feed back into one another. The model predicts that (1) stock market's expected return and volatility increase as more investor capital is intermediated by funds, (2) fund's expense ratio is stable despite volatile market, (3) aggregate fund flow is positively (inversely) related to subsequent (past) market return, and (4) funds provide investors with a volatility hedge by adjusting market exposure counter-cyclically.Type:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Metadata only , Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result(2015-09)Schlegel, J.C.Type:journal articleJournal: - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: Open Access , One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable(2014-07)Montez, J. V.We study a model where a central player (the principal) bargains bilaterally with each of several players (the agents) to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game. It is known that, if the payments that were previously agreed (with each of the remaining agents) are renegotiated in case any bilateral negotiation permanently breaks down, then the Shapley value is the unique efficient and individual rational outcome consistent with bilateral Nash bargaining. Here we show that when instead the agreed payments cannot be renegotiated the outcome is also unique but it now coincides with the Nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy problem. We provide a strategic foundation for this outcome. Then we study how such renegotiation affects the principal's payoff according to the properties of the surplus function. We find, for example, that renegotiation benefits the principal when agents are complements and it hurts him when they are substitutes (situations with, respectively, increasing and decreasing marginal contributions).Type:journal articleJournal: