Titre
How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times
Type
article
Institution
UNIL/CHUV/Unisanté + institutions partenaires
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Fischbacher, U.
Auteure/Auteur
Hertwig, R.
Auteure/Auteur
Bruhin, A.
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
Liens vers les unités
ISSN
0894-3257
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2013-12
Volume
26
Numéro
5
Première page
462
Dernière page/numéro d’article
476
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini-ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross-validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts any positive offer; two groups process primarily the objective properties of the allocations (fairness and kindness) and need more time the more properties need to be examined; and a fourth group, which takes more time than the others, appears to take into account what they would have proposed had they been put in the role of the proposer. We discuss implications of this joint decision-response time analysis.
PID Serval
serval:BIB_300C5C700691
Date de création
2012-11-21T18:36:42.765Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-20T19:44:04Z