Titre
Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ? Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage
Type
article
Institution
UNIL/CHUV/Unisanté + institutions partenaires
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Athias, L.
Auteure/Auteur
Saussier, S.
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
Liens vers les unités
ISSN
0035-2764
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Volume
58
Numéro
3
Première page
565
Dernière page/numéro d’article
576
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
français
Résumé
In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework - including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs - and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.
PID Serval
serval:BIB_3DF4D74D7B8A
Date de création
2014-06-10T07:39:11.021Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-20T19:48:56Z