Titre
Helping formulate propositions in forensic DNA analysis
Type
article
Institution
UNIL/CHUV/Unisanté + institutions partenaires
Périodique
Auteur(s)
Buckleton, John
Auteure/Auteur
Bright, Jo-Anne
Auteure/Auteur
Taylor, Duncan
Auteure/Auteur
Evett, Ian
Auteure/Auteur
Hicks, Tacha
Auteure/Auteur
Jackson, Graham
Auteure/Auteur
Curran, James M.
Auteure/Auteur
Liens vers les personnes
Liens vers les unités
ISSN
1355-0306
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014-07
Volume
54
Numéro
4
Première page
258
Dernière page/numéro d’article
261
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The Bayesian paradigm is the preferred approach to evidence interpretation. It requires the evaluation of the probability of the evidence under at least two propositions. The value of the findings (i.e., our LR) will depend on these propositions and the case information, so it is crucial to identify which propositions are useful for the case at hand. Previously, a number of principles have been advanced and largely accepted for the evaluation of evidence. In the evaluation of traces involving DNA mixtures there may be more than two propositions possible. We apply these principles to some exemplar situations. We also show that in some cases, when there are no clear propositions or no defendant, a forensic scientist may be able to generate explanations to account for observations. In that case, the scientist plays a role of investigator, rather than evaluator. We believe that it is helpful for the scientist to distinguish those two roles.
PID Serval
serval:BIB_553FF5E8A335
PMID
Date de création
2016-03-07T13:18:54.035Z
Date de création dans IRIS
2025-05-20T19:52:20Z